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What’s on the Menu? 
Included versus Excluded Investment Funds  
for Singapore’s Central Provident Fund Investors  
 
 
Abstract 
 
As one of the oldest and largest national mandatory defined contribution pension systems, 
Singapore’s Central Provident Fund (CPF) permits employees to invest their retirement 
accumulations in a variety of investment instruments rather than leaving them in a government-
managed investment fund. Many plan participants avail themselves of this opportunity, selecting 
from a menu of more than two hundred “included” funds that satisfy specific admission criteria 
set by the CPF Board. Nevertheless, many other funds are excluded from the list of eligible 
retirement system investments. This paper shows that the “included/non-included” screening 
criteria have been effective, in that included fund managers earned higher average returns, 
demonstrated better stock-picking, and displayed better market-timing skills, than their excluded 
fund counterparts. In addition, the included funds exhibited stronger persistence in performance, 
though they offered marginally lower diversification benefits to plan participants.  
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What’s on the Menu? 
Included versus Excluded Investment Funds  
for Singapore’s Central Provident Fund Investors  
  
 In most defined contribution (DC) plans, workers have the responsibility to accumulate 
sufficient saving to finance their own retirement needs. How much wealth they accumulate then 
depends on the quantum saved over their working lives, as well as the savers’ own investment 
choices, often hampered by financial illiteracy (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007). This paper 
investigates how one of the world’s largest and oldest national mandatory defined contribution 
systems, Singapore’s Central Provident Fund (CPF), has shaped the environment in which its 
participants make investment decisions and what outcomes have resulted as a consequence of 
restricting the menu from which participants can choose.  Our findings have implications not 
only for Singapore, but also for other national funded pension schemes that permit participants to 
opt-out of a centrally-managed pool and select their own fund managers, including Australia.  
 Founded in 1955, the Central Provident Fund, Singapore’s mandatory retirement saving 
scheme, has more than 3 million members (Low and Aw, 1997, 2004).  Initially the fund Board 
exclusively managed workers’ assets for them, but from 1986 onwards, participants have been 
permitted to invest a portion of their retirement saving in professionally-managed funds such as 
unit trusts (mutual funds) and investment-linked insurance products (ILPs) that they elect 
themselves, as well as other investment instruments (Koh et al. 2007).  In all cases these funds 
must be managed by private-sector professional fund managers, and while the list of options is 
long, it is not unlimited, as the set of admitted instruments termed “CPF-included” funds must 
satisfy specific criteria set out by the institution’s governing Board. In what follows, we assess 
whether the included/non-included distinction has been useful to plan participants as a measure 
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of performance. Specifically, we ask whether the “CPF-included” funds included on the menu 
outperformed the excluded funds when measured against standard performance benchmarks.   
 This question is of interest for several reasons. First, prior research confirms that average 
investors face difficulties in making investment decisions due to investment inertia, naive 
portfolio diversification, excessive reliance on conservative investment options, and financial 
illiteracy regarding basic investment concepts (Mitchell et al. 2007).  This raises doubt as to how 
plan participants can effectively sieve through the menu of complex financial instruments made 
available to them, and in turn this highlights a potential role for additional government oversight. 
Second, the track record of participants who utilized the CPF Investment Scheme (CPFIS) in 
Singapore was poor over the period 2004-07, when half (47 percent) of plan participants incurred 
losses and only one-fifth (22 percent) did better than what they could have by leaving their 
money in the government-managed fund. Third, participants have increasingly delegated their 
retirement portfolio investment decisions to professional fund managers: CPF-included funds 
constituted just 16 percent (or $0.5 billion) of the unit trust industry’s assets under management 
in 1997, which surged to two-thirds by 2007 (67 percent or $26 billion; see MAS 2007).1  In 
view of participants’ rising reliance on the government “included” list, we argue that it is 
sensible to ask whether these unit trusts did at least as well as those excluded from the list.
 In what follows, we first briefly review the literature on performance benchmarks used to 
evaluate professionally-managed investment funds, and then describe the Singapore's CPF 
Investment Scheme and its structure. This is followed by an analysis of the performance of 
“CPF-included” unit trusts compared to those excluded from the investment scheme. Specifically, 
we investigate their aggregate performance statistics, return and risk profiles, degree of 
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diversification, stock selection and market timing abilities of funds as well as persistence of 
performance. 
 
Measuring Fund Performance 
Much of the literature on fund performance has judged manager stock selection skill 
using fund alphas.  Early US mutual fund studies by Jensen (1968) and Sharpe (1966) showed 
that fund managers generally did not outperform their benchmarks and hence did not exhibit 
stock selection skill; more recent work by Malkiel (1995) and Gruber (1996) has corroborated 
this conclusion. Though mutual funds are not generally found to report positive alphas, studies 
by Grinblatt and Titman (1992) and Hendricks et al. (1993) did report evidence of persistence in 
mutual fund performance over shorter horizons of up to five years.  Thereafter, further 
investigation by Malkiel (1995) revealed that much of the persistence in performance was 
restricted to the 1970s and disappeared in the 1980s.  Carhart (1997) showed that persistence in 
U.S. mutual fund performance could be explained by common factors in stock returns and 
investment expenses. In summary, the literature on US mutual funds has generally not been able 
to confirm long-term abnormal positive performance by professional fund managers.  
Another way researchers have sought evidence of above-average fund manager 
performance involves examining their market timing ability. Here U.S. evidence on this 
performance dimension is mixed (Treynor and Mazuy 1966; Chang and Lewellen 1984; 
Henriksson 1984; Lehmann and Modest 1987; Cumby and Glen 1990; see also Wagner, Shellans 
and Paul 1992; Brocanto and Chandy 1994; and Ferson and Schadt 1996).   When non-stationary 
systematic risk levels in portfolios that consequently affect mutual fund performance is 
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considered, some researchers have found some confirmation of significant timing ability among 
fund managers (Pfleiderer and Bhattacharya, 1993; Kon and Jen 1979; Miller and Gressis 1980).  
As for Singapore’s unit trusts, Koh et al. (2007) noted that only relatively few (16%) of 
CPF participants hold assets outside the government-run fund.  Tse and Chia (1997) studied the 
performance of 36 equity unit trusts which had invested primarily in the Singapore and Asian 
financial markets (including those outside the CPFIS list) over the period 1990-99. These fund 
managers appeared not to possess stock selection or market-timing skills, and their performance 
rankings across years were inconsistent.  Nevertheless that study showed that unit trusts provided 
diversification benefits and higher risk-adjusted returns than the risk-free rate. A more recent 
study by Chia, Chua, and Tsui (2007) focused on the performance of 87 CPFIS-included unit 
trusts or about one-third of the 231 funds available over the period 1992-2006.  That paper found 
mixed evidence of stock picking skill, and no evidence of market-timing skill, among the set of 
included fund managers. In addition, fund manager performance was inconsistent over the period. 
 In what follows, we offer a more comprehensive analysis of the risk-return characteristics 
of CPFIS-included versus excluded unit trusts available to CPF investors, for two decades ending 
in December 2001 and 2007.  Our dataset used comes from Morningstar Research Private 
Limited2
 
 (“Morningstar”) which allows us to evaluate the performance of a wide range of both 
included and excluded funds on the CPF list. Besides equity-based funds, our study also analyzes 
balanced and income funds. Accordingly we provide a more comprehensive evaluation of unit 
trusts than previous studies. 
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Singapore’s Central Provident Fund Investment Scheme    
The CPF system is a mandatory defined contribution plan that receives a portion of 
employees’ monthly wages up to a ceiling amount. Contribution rates and caps have fluctuated 
over time, but the current rates have held steady at between 8.5 to 34.5 percent of monthly salary 
depending on the employee’s age, and a ceiling monthly salary cap of S$4,500 (approximately 
US$3,333).  
When the system was first established, the Board centrally directed all investible funds 
and paid a fixed and government-set return on the assets. Today participants’ monthly 
contributions go into the CPF Ordinary Account (CPF-OA) that pays a 2.5% risk-free rate on 
money defaulted into it, and the CPF Special Account (CPF-SA) which pays 4% on balances.3
Table 1 here  
 
Alternatively, under the CPF Investment Scheme launched in 1986, participants may invest their 
accumulations in any of a list of “included” instruments; the menu of instruments offered differs 
for the Ordinary and the Special Accounts (see Table 1).  For example, members may invest their 
CPF-OA funds in fixed deposits, corporate bonds, property funds, equities traded on the 
Singapore stock exchange, bonds guaranteed by the Singapore government, annuities and 
endowments, ILPs, unit trusts, exchange traded funds (ETFs), fund management accounts, gold, 
Singapore Government Treasury Bills and Gold ETFs.  Since the SA funds are designated for 
retirement, there is a narrower set of permitted investment instruments;  this list includes fixed 
deposits, Singapore Government bonds, Statutory Board bonds and bonds guaranteed by 
Singapore Government, annuities, endowment insurance policies and selected Investment-
Linked Insurance products, unit trusts and exchange-traded funds classified under the lowest 
three risk categories classified by CPF.  
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Growth of Unit Trusts under the CPFIS.    
Similar to mutual funds, unit trusts in Singapore are investment vehicles that pool money 
from numerous individuals to invest in a portfolio of securities such as shares, bonds, or money 
market instruments.  Unit trusts are attractive to investors because they offer diversification 
benefits and market liquidity, as well as access to the services of professional fund managers. 
There were 349 Collective Investment Schemes (CIS) in 2007 of which 162 were included in the 
CPF Investment Scheme. The dollar value of funds contributed by CPF-included CIS was 67 
percent (or $26 billion) of total CIS assets in 2007, a big jump from the 16 percent (or $0.5 
billion) in 1997.  
 
Admission Criteria of CPF Investment Scheme 
Not all unit trusts are included in the CPF Investment Scheme menu; rather, the CPF 
Board has announced specific criteria to screen investment products.  As outlined in Table 2, 
new funds applying for admission must be evaluated based on factors including the fund’s 
investment philosophy, the backgrounds of key decision-makers, the appropriateness and quality 
of its research and analysis, its portfolio construction and implementation, and its past 
performance.  The Board also seeks to boost the included funds’ performance by requiring that 
new funds must be in the top 25th percentile of their global peer groups and have a track record 
of at least three years. In addition, admitted funds must levy sales charges of less than three 
percent, and expense ratios must not exceed the median of the peer group.  Funds not meeting 
these criteria may not accept new CPF funds from plan participants. 
Table 2 here  
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Rather than screening each of the funds by itself, the Board has outsourced this task to 
Morningstar, to evaluate whether unit trusts seeking admission into the CPFIS list meet all 
admission criteria. Hitherto the Board has not expunged any already-included funds for having 
high expense ratios or front-end loads, but it has prevented them from taking in new CPF 
investments from plan participants if their expense ratios or sales charges fail to meet these 
criteria. As a result, existing funds with poor performance can remain in the CPF Investment 
Scheme indefinitely. On the other hand, a fund that undergoes major changes in its 
organizational structure, fund structure, or management teams may be subject to review and re-
evaluation, and the Board could weed out an underperforming fund if it failed to meet the 
admission criteria during the re-evaluation. Such funds would then need to inform the CPFIS 
investors in writing and offer them three options:  holding on to the units bought, redeeming 
them, or switching their units for free into other CPFIS funds meeting the criteria. 
 
An Analysis of Fund Performance: On and Off the List 
To investigate empirically whether existing policy has effectively shut out 
underperforming funds with the screening criteria, we undertake an empirical examination to 
determine how the CPF “included” funds compare to those not on the list. The latter might be 
excluded either because they did not meet admission criteria, or they may have voluntarily elected 
not to participate. The model uses the time series of fund returns having a track record of at least ten 
years ending December 2001 corresponding to a bust period, and a second ten-year period ending 
December 2007, which coincided with a bull phase in the stock market.  The dataset was obtained 
from Morningstar Asia which provided monthly price observations at month-end for unit trusts 
on the Singaporean financial market. We utilize a reinvested income price series which assumes 
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that dividend distributions are reinvested. These fund returns are then compared to individual 
fund benchmark returns specified by the unit trust as well as the three-month Treasury bill rate 
and the CPF-OA rate (the CPF default interest rate).  
 
Aggregate Performance of CPFIS Unit Trusts 
Like stocks, unit trust values are volatile and fluctuate in tandem with the swings of the 
stock market. Consequently, holders of unit trusts are not immune against losses in the short run.  
As a rule, unit trusts are best seen as long-term investments unsuited for short-term speculation; if 
people hold unit trust investments over the long-term, they will anticipate being able to beat the risk-
free rate through capital appreciation and reinvestment of dividends. We test this hypothesis by 
comparing the performance of CPF-included and excluded unit trusts against the three-month T-bill 
rate, the CPF-OA rate, and the funds’ designated benchmark index.  When investors take risk by 
investing in unit trusts, they expect to earn a return higher than Treasury rates.   And since investors 
can simply leave their saving in the default government-managed account paying the CPF-OA rate, 
this is also a reasonable yardstick against which to compare unit trust returns. Given that fund 
managers are full-time professionals with investment skills, they are expected to beat passive 
benchmark indices. 
Table 3 reports summary statistics on the performance of included and excluded unit trusts 
in the Singaporean marketplace, for two ten-year periods.   Both classes of unit trusts reported 
average returns that exceeded the CPF-OA rate and three-month T-bill rate, which implies that 
investors who invested their retirement saving in unit trusts did better than those who left their 
money in the CPF-default accounts. The average return of CPFIS-included unit trusts was 7.96 
percent for the ten-year period ending 12/01, and 10.27 percent for the decade ending 12/07. These 
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returns are both much higher than the 6.36 and 7.32 percent turned in by the excluded unit trusts for 
the same periods. A difference of means test was applied and our results show that the mean return 
of the included funds for period ending December 2007 was significantly higher than that of 
excluded funds at the 1% significance level. Accordingly, the funds included on the list 
outperformed those excluded from the list, in both the bull and bear markets examined. 
Table 3 here 
Results also show that the performance of unit trusts did vary according to underlying stock 
market conditions. That is, the unit trusts performed better during the bull market (the decade 
ending 12/07) than during the previous decade’s bear market (ending 12/01). And we can also 
conclude that the included unit trusts performed significantly better than those not on the list, 
particularly during the bear market.  Approximately 82 percent of the CPFIS-included funds beat 
the CPF-OA rate and the T-bill rate, but only 62 percent of the excluded funds did so.  In addition, 
88 percent of the included funds outperformed their benchmark over the same period, versus only 
56 percent of the excluded funds.  On the other hand, during the bull market ending 12/07, both sets 
of funds performed comparably although more included funds beat their benchmarks than did the 
excluded set.  
 
Comparison of Unit Trust Risk-Return Profiles 
 Investors are often advised by financial planners to choose funds that match their preferred 
risk profiles, where the pools are broadly classified as equity, income, or balanced funds.  Equity 
funds offer higher expected returns and higher risk, since they invest in growth stocks with a high 
potential for capital appreciation but pay relatively low dividends.  Equity funds are therefore 
usually deemed most suitable for younger investors comfortable with assuming risk.  Income funds, 
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on the other hand, offer low expected returns by assuming low risk as they usually invest in bonds, 
money market instruments, and fixed deposits. Most advisers deem these more suitable for retirees 
or the very risk averse.  And balanced funds offer investors moderate capital growth and income at 
moderate risk, perhaps most suitable for investors with average risk preferences. 
 Next we seek to investigate whether the unit trusts in our sample positioned their funds 
according to the risk and return profiles outlined in their prospectuses.  We measure the unit trust 
performance by their average return and average excess return, and their risks by betas or standard 
deviations of returns.  Table 4 reports results for the equity, balanced, and income funds in our 
sample, where we see that the funds generally provided realized returns and risk consistent with 
their prospectus profiles.  In the bear market, the decade ending 12/07, the included equity funds 
earned the highest average return (11.19 percent) followed by balanced (7.74 percent) and income 
funds (3.59 percent).  Equity funds also had the highest risk with a standard deviation of 23.44 
percent, exceeding that of balanced (15.89 percent) and income funds (2.62 percent).   The excluded 
funds turned in similar results with equity funds earning the highest return and highest risk, and 
income funds earning the lowest return at the lowest risk. During the bull market, results are less 
clear. Here balanced funds reported the highest return (9.26 percent) as well as the highest risk 
levels (25.08 percent). By contrast, the return-risk profile of equity and income funds conformed to 
expectations. 
Table 4 here 
 
Risk Diversification Profiles 
One reason that unit trusts attract the small investor is that they offer risk diversification 
otherwise unattainable for those having only meager assets to invest in the market.  In practice we 
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measure risk diversification by the R-square statistic from a regression of excess fund returns on the 
excess returns of the benchmark index in equation 1: 
 Rjt - Rft  =  αj + βj (Rmt - Rft)  + εjt                  (1) 
Panel A of Table 5 reports the R-square statistic on equity and balanced funds for both our sample 
periods (income funds are excluded as fund managers do not try to diversify across asset classes and 
industries). The results show that both the included and excluded funds are relatively well 
diversified:  average R-squares of equity funds range from 0.71 to 0.83, while for balanced funds 
the figures range from 0.71 to 0.82.  These results imply that over 71 percent of the variation in 
equity and balanced fund returns can be explained by their benchmark indices, confirming that unit 
trusts have successfully helped investors diversify their portfolio risk.  The results also show that 
excluded unit trusts are marginally more diversified than the included set. A possible explanation 
for this result is that fund managers in the included list deliberately assume more idiosyncratic risk 
seeking to beat the market. Our results in the next section seem to confirm this conclusion, since 
fund managers of included funds also report more positive abnormal returns.  
Table 5 here 
 
Stock Selection Skill 
Investors may be attracted to unit trusts as they can tap professional fund manager’s 
expertise to help them earn higher risk-adjusted returns than what they could achieve on their own.  
Since the professional managers monitor the market on a full-time basis, they can be expected to 
exhibit stock selection skill, or the ability to pick under-valued stocks for inclusion in a portfolio.  
The conventional way to gauge stock selection skill uses Jensen’s alpha, which refers to the 
intercept term αj in the excess return equation (1) above.  Fund managers who possess superior 
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stock selection skills should report a positive alpha, while those with inferior skills will have a 
negative one. 
Panel B of Table 5 reports the Jensen’s alphas for equity and balanced funds for the two 
decade-long periods under study. Here we see that the average alpha earned by included funds is 
positive for all holding periods, and it ranges from 0.07 to 0.62 percent.  By contrast, excluded 
funds earned much smaller alphas, ranging from -0.01 to 0.1 percent. A difference of means test 
found that the mean alpha of included funds was larger than that of excluded funds at the 1 percent 
significance level. In addition, more included funds had significantly positive alphas than the 
excluded funds: that is, 22.5 percent of the included equity funds had significantly positive alphas 
versus only 11.43 percent of the excluded equity funds in the decade of the bear market.  
 
Market Timing Ability 
In addition to stock selection, fund managers can use market timing to outperform their 
benchmark indices.  For instance, a fund manager with market timing skill can increase his holdings 
of risky assets or the risk level of his fund when the market is rising, perhaps by overweighting 
stocks and underweighting fixed-income securities. Conversely, in a falling market, a superior 
market timer would underweight stocks and overweight fixed-income securities. The standard way 
to measure market timing uses the gamma term γj in a quadratic regression suggested by Treynor 
and Mazuy (1966): 
Rjt - Rft  =  αj + βj (Rmt - Rft) +  γj(Rmt - Rft)2 + εjt                 (2) 
Here a positive γj indicates that the manager is a superior market timer, increasing the weighting 
of risky securities in a market upturn and decreasing the weighting in a market downturn.   
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Results in Panel C of Table 5 show that the average gammas of both included and 
excluded funds cluster around zero (the only exception is for excluded balanced funds for period 
ending 12/07 where the average gamma was -0.01).  This implies that fund managers did not 
exhibit market timing skills overall, though there was more suggestion of market timing ability 
among equity fund managers compared to balanced fund managers. In addition, the funds on the 
included list do suggest some additional market timing ability compared to excluded funds: 
between 27.5-29 percent of the equity funds reported gammas larger than zero (significant at the 
five percent level), more than the 13.33-22.86 percent reported for excluded funds.  In general, 
however, most fund managers did not exhibit market timing skills.  
 
Performance Persistence by Unit Trust Managers 
Some investors believe they can identify fund managers who are able to outperform the 
market, so they seek out funds with a consistently good track record. To measure the consistency of 
fund performance, it is useful to rank the unit trusts and compare rankings across consecutive 
sample periods.  We first compute Jensen’s alpha for all unit trusts over a sub-period of 30 months 
and rank them in decreasing order; then we repeat the process for the next, non-overlapping 30 
month sub-period to generate another ranking and compute the Spearman's rank correlation 
coefficient (ρ) for these two pairs of rankings. Under the null hypothesis of no persistence in 
performance of unit trusts over time, the two sets of rankings will be uncorrelated and ρ should 
be close to zero.  
Results appear in Table 6, where we see that the rankings are significant at the five percent 
level in the bull market period ending 12/07, but not for the earlier bear market ending 12/01. 
Interestingly, there is some persistence for equity funds and the Spearman coefficient for included 
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funds is much larger than for excluded funds in the later period where the Spearman coefficients are 
not significantly different from zero for the earlier period.  Therefore, overall, the empirical results 
on fund manager performance persistence is mixed, though the included equity funds showed more 
persistence in performance than did the excluded funds.  
Table 6 here 
 
Discussion and Conclusions  
 Government regulators around the world are striving to shape the financial environment 
within which often naïve and overwhelmed investors can grow their pension assets (Hinz et al. 
2010).  Singapore has recognized that many workers may find it daunting to select investment 
instruments and judge manager performance, so the Provident Fund Board has defined criteria 
for so-called included funds in an effort to protect investors from underperformance. We show 
that these criteria have been effective over the two ten-year spans ending in 2001 and 2007, since 
included funds performed better than excluded funds along several dimensions.  Specifically, 
fund managers earned higher average returns, demonstrated better stock-picking, and displayed 
better market-timing skills, than their excluded fund counterparts. In addition, the included funds 
exhibited stronger persistence in performance, though they offered marginally lower 
diversification benefits to plan participants.  
 While this is good news, it is also the case that restricting investment portfolios available 
to participants is likely to be only a partial step toward enhancing workers’ financial security. 
That is, people often make serious investment mistakes even when they are offered extremely 
efficient investment choices (Tang et al. 2010). As a consequence, it remains essential to 
enhance fund competitiveness in an effort to drive down costs, and to educate participants 
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regarding the importance of saving, interest compounding, and risk/return attributes of their 
pension investments.  
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Table 1.  Financial Instruments Available for Investment in the CPF Ordinary (OA) and 
Special Accounts (SA) 
 
Ordinary Account Special Account 
All of OA assets may be invested in: All of SA assets may be invested in: 
Fixed Deposits Fixed Deposits 
Singapore Government Bonds Singapore Government Bonds 
Statutory Board Bonds Statutory Board Bonds (Secondary Market only) 
Bonds Guaranteed by Singapore Government Bonds Guaranteed by Singapore Government 
Annuities Annuities 
Endowment Insurance Policies Endowment Insurance Policies 
Investment-linked Insurance Products Selected Investment-Linked Insurance Products* 
Unit Trusts Selected Unit Trusts* 
Exchange Traded Funds Selected Exchange Traded Funds* 
Fund Management Accounts   
  
Up to 35% of investible assets# may be 
invested in:   
Shares   
Property Funds (or real estate investment trusts)   
Corporate Bonds   
  
Up to 10% of investible assets# may be 
invested in:   
Gold (currently only UOB offers new gold 
investments)   
Source: CPF (2010)  
Notes: 
# Investible assets refer to the net Ordinary Account balance after withdrawals for education and investment. 
* Those found in the lowest three tiers of the CPFIS Risk Classification System Table unless otherwise stated. Risk 
classification tables for unit trusts, investment-linked insurance products, and exchange traded funds are at 
www.cpf.gov.sg/cpf_info/Benefits/Asset/Assetenh.asp. 
1) Annuities, endowment insurance policies, & investment-linked insurance products must be offered by insurance 
companies included under CPFIS.  Endowment policy maturity dates must not be later than the member's 62nd 
birthday. 
2) Unit trusts and investment-linked insurance products must be managed by Fund Management Companies 
included under CPFIS.  Fund managers are required to invest according to the Investment Guidelines set by CPF 
Board. 
3) Exchange traded funds must meet guidelines set by CPF Board and be listed on the Singapore Exchange-
Securities Trading (SGX-ST). 
4) Fund managers of fund management accounts are required to invest according to the Investment Guidelines set 
by CPF Board. 
5) Shares of Companies, Units of Property Funds or Property Trusts and Corporate Bonds (CPFIS-OA only) must 
be offered by companies incorporated in Singapore.  Also, they must be fully paid ordinary or preference shares or 
corporate bonds listed on the Singapore Exchange-Securities Trading (SGX-ST). 
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Table 2. Criteria for Admitting Unit Trusts into the CPF Investment Scheme  
 
1. Overall Evaluation Benchmark  
Funds1 admitted into CPFIS must be ranked within the top 25 percentile of funds in their global 
peer group.2 The ranking will be based on factors such as the capability of fund managers, the 
investment philosophy of the fund, its key decision makers, the appropriateness and quality of its 
research and analysis, its portfolio construction and implementation, and its past performance. 
2.  Track Record 
 
New Funds into the CPFIS should have a track record of good performance for at least 3 years. 
 
3.  Sales Charge 
 
New Funds admitted into CPFIS must have sales charges not exceeding 3%. 
  
4.  Expense Ratio 
 
Admitted funds must have an expense ratio4 lower than the median expense ratio of existing 
CPF-included funds in its risk category. The median expense ratios will be reviewed annually. A 
sample of the median expense ratio is given in the table below. 
 
Risk Classification3 Median Expense Ratios (%) of CPFIS Unit Trusts and 
Investment-Linked Insurance Products as at 31 
December 04 [Rounded off to the nearest 0.05] 
Higher risk 1.95 
Medium to High Risk 1.75 
Low to Medium Risk 1.15 
Lower Risk 0.65 
 
Source: http://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/Business-Partner/Gen-Info/CPFIS/CPFIS_ApplicFMCS.htm 
Notes:  
1 Funds refer to unit trusts and investment-linked insurance products under CPFIS. 
2 This refers to comparison of funds of similar asset class/strategy on a world-wide basis. 
3 Risk categories are: 
 a) Higher risk - Funds that invest in equities. 
 b) Medium to high risk – Funds that invest in a mixture of equities and bonds. 
 c) Low to medium risk – Funds that invest in fixed income products or bonds. 
  d) Lower risk – Funds that invest in money market products.    
4 Expense ratios refer to the operating costs of unit trusts and investment-linked insurance products which include 
investment management fees expressed as a percentage of the fund's average net assets for a given time period. The 
expense ratio does not include brokerage costs and various other transaction costs that may also contribute to a 
fund's total expenses.   
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Table 3. Summary Statistics for Singaporean Unit Trusts (10-year Holding Period) 
 
Summary Statistics Bear Market: Decade ending 12/01 
Bull Market: Decade 
ending 12/07 
 
CPFIS-included Unit Trust:   
Number of funds 17 48 
Average Annual Return (%) 7.96 10.27* 
CPF OA (average) annual rate (%) 3.23 2.77 
T-notes/bond Yield annual rate (%) 3.73 3.02 
Percentage of funds with:   
Average return > 0 88.2 97.9 
Average return > 3-months’ T-bill rate 82.4 85.4 
Average return > CPF rate 82.4 85.4 
Average return > Benchmark return 88.2 64.6 
 
Non-included Unit Trusts:   
Number of funds 16 94 
Average Annual Return (%) 6.36 7.32 
Percentage of funds with:   
Average return > 0 81.3 98.9 
Average return > 3-months’ T-bill rate 62.5 86.2 
Average return > CPF rate 68.8 87.2 
Average return > Benchmark return 56.3 46.8 
 
Source: Authors’ computations; see text.  
* A difference of means test showed that mean return included funds of 10.27% is significantly 
larger than 7.32% of excluded funds at the 1% significance level. 
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Table 4:  Return and Risk Profiles of Included and Excluded Unit Trusts (%) 
 
Types of unit 
trusts Average 
Bear Market: Decade Ending 
12/01 
Bull Market: Decade Ending 
12/07 
  Equity Balanced Income Equity Balanced Income 
CPFIS-
included Unit 
Trusts 
 
Return 
 
8.07 
 
9.26 
 
6.51 
 
11.19 
 
7.74 
 
3.59 
Excess return 4.19 5.33 2.68 7.94 4.58 0.55 
Standard deviation 22.96 25.08 4.50 23.44 15.89 2.62 
Beta 0.88 0.78 N.A. 0.86 0.96 N.A. 
        
Non-included 
Unit Trusts 
Return 6.40 NA* 5.70 8.13 6.52 4.72 
Excess return 2.57 NA* 1.91 4.97 3.45 1.69 
Standard deviation 21.62 NA* 4.09 21.46 9.04 4.73 
Beta 0.88 NA* N.A. 0.95 0.97 N.A. 
 
Note: * Balanced funds not reported due to lack of sample.   
Source: Authors’ computations; see text. 
 
25 
 
Table 5:  R-square, Alphas, and Gammas of Unit Trusts 
 
 
Bear Market: Decade 
Ending 12/01 
Bull Market: Decade 
Ending 12/07 
Equity Balanced Equity Balanced 
Panel A:  Average R-square of regression     
 
CPFIS-included Unit Trusts 
 
R-square 0.72 0.82 0.71 0.71 
Non-included Unit Trusts R-square 0.80 NA 0.83 0.77 
     
Panel B: Average alpha of unit trusts     
CPFIS-included Unit Trusts 
 
Alpha (%) 
 
0.35*** 
 
0.62 
 
0.32*** 
 
0.07 
% where Alpha > 0* 14.00 100.00 22.50 0.00 
Non-included Unit Trusts 
 
Alpha (%) 
 
0.09 
 
NA** 
 
0.10 
 
-0.01 
% where Alpha > 0* 6.67 NA** 11.43 0.00 
      
Panel C: Average gamma of unit trusts     
CPFIS-included Unit Trusts 
 
Gamma 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
% where Gamma > 0* 29.00 0.00 27.50 50.00 
Non-included Unit Trusts Gamma 0.00 NA
** 0.00 -0.01 
% where Gamma > 0* 13.33 NA** 22.86 0.00 
      
Notes:  
*   Significant at 5%. 
** Balanced funds not reported due to lack of sample.   
*** A difference of means test showed that the average alpha of included funds was larger than that 
of excluded funds at the 1% significance level. 
Source: Authors’ computations; see text. 
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Table 6:  Spearman Coefficients (ρ) of Unit Trusts Ranking on the Jensen Alpha Measure 
 
Type of fund 
Bear Market: Decade Ending 
12/01 
Bull Market: Decade Ending 
12/07 
Ρ # of funds ρ # of funds 
CPFIS-included Unit Trusts:     
Equity 0.1716 34 0.4634* 92 
Balanced 0.8 4 0.0281 19 
Income NA@ 2 0.0055 13 
Non-included Unit Trusts:     
Equity 0.0365 60 0.3012* 164 
Balanced NA@ 2 0.5238 8 
Income -0.2308 14 0.3086* 48 
Notes: 
*  Significant at 5% level 
@ Statistical significance not computed due to lack of sample. 
Source: Authors’ computations; see text. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 The CPF-included funds can also accept investments from non-CPF monies so these funds’ 
growth is not due entirely to the investment of CPF monies (see MAS 2007). 
2 Morningstar merged with Standard & Poor’s Fund Services Asia in 2007.  Standard & Poor’s 
Fund Services Asia has been appointed by the Singaporean Funds Performance Tracking 
Committee, a committee chaired by and comprising of representatives from the Investment 
Management Association of Singapore (IMAS), the Life Insurance Association of Singapore, 
and the Securities Investors Association (Singapore), to monitor the performance of all unit trusts 
and ILPs included under the CPFIS.  Standard & Poor’s Fund Services Asia monitors the 
performance of all unit trusts (UTs) and ILPs included in the CPFIS admissible set of investment 
options since mid-2002 (IMAS, various years). 
3 There is also a CPF Medisave Account (CPF-MA) returning four percent fixed which we do 
not focus on here. The CPF-OA rate of 2.5 percent is a floor rate since the actual interest rate 
paid is the maximum of 2.5 percent or a  weighted average of the 12-month fixed deposit rates 
(80 percent) and the month-end saving rates (20 percent) of major local banks over the preceding 
three months.  Plan participants can therefore expect to earn high default interest rates when 
market interest rates are trending upwards. As for the CPF-SA rate, it is now pegged to the 12-
month average yield of the 10-year Singapore Government Security (10YSGS) plus 1 percent 
(since January 2008). 
